In a tragic incident last week, gunmen carried out the deadliest attack in Russia in two decades, leading to a major security blunder. This occurred just hours after authorities added the international LGBTQ+ “movement” to a government register of extremist and terrorist groups, following a Russian Supreme Court ruling last year that targeted gay and transgender people in the country.
While the register also includes groups like al-Qaida and the Islamic State group, the latter of which claimed responsibility for the concert hall attack, the inclusion of LGBTQ+ activists has raised questions about the threat assessment methods of Russia’s extensive security services.
The attack on March 22, which resulted in over 140 fatalities, marked a significant security failure under President Vladimir Putin, who assumed power 24 years ago with a firm stance against those he labeled as terrorists from the Russian region of Chechnya, which was then embroiled in a violent insurgency.
This security lapse has led to widespread speculation about how gunmen could easily massacre so many people at a public event. A week after the massacre, the focus is on understanding the failure to prevent the concert hall attack and the government’s disorganized response to it.
In recent years, Russia’s vast security apparatus has concentrated on suppressing political opposition, independent media, and civil society groups in the most severe crackdown since the Soviet era. This repression has only intensified following the invasion of Ukraine.
Individual protesters are rapidly suppressed by riot police. After the death of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in prison on February 16, mourners who brought flowers and candles to makeshift memorials were swiftly detained. Surveillance cameras equipped with facial recognition software are widely used.
Many opposition groups have been labeled as “extremists,” a designation that carries lengthy prison sentences for anyone associated with them. Navalny was serving a 19-year sentence on charges of extremism, and his political network is on the register of extremist and terrorist organizations, just like the LGBTQ+ “movement” that was added to the register of Russia’s state watchdog for financial crimes on March 22.
Leonid Volkov, a top associate of Navalny who lives abroad, suggested that the security agencies are too preoccupied with the political crackdown to pay attention to terrorism threats. He stated on his messaging app channel, “They like inventing fictitious terrorists — those who think or love differently — so they don’t have time for real ones.”
After the attack, law enforcement agencies followed a familiar pattern of repression, detaining people over social media posts about the incident that authorities deemed offensive. Andrei Kolesnikov, a senior fellow at Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, argued that security forces focused on Kremlin critics have proven inadequate in addressing real threats to the country.
The U.S. government claimed that it informed Russia in early March about an imminent attack under the “duty to warn” rule, which obliges U.S. intelligence officials to share such information, even with adversaries. However, it was unclear how specific this warning was. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow also issued a public notice on March 7 advising Americans to avoid crowds in the capital over the next 48 hours due to “imminent” plans by extremists to target large gatherings, including concerts.
In a tragic incident last week, gunmen carried out the deadliest attack in Russia in two decades, leading to a major security blunder. This occurred just hours after authorities added the international LGBTQ+ “movement” to a government register of extremist and terrorist groups, following a Russian Supreme Court ruling last year that targeted gay and transgender people in the country.
While the register also includes groups like al-Qaida and the Islamic State group, the latter of which claimed responsibility for the concert hall attack, the inclusion of LGBTQ+ activists has raised questions about the threat assessment methods of Russia’s extensive security services.
The attack on March 22, which resulted in over 140 fatalities, marked a significant security failure under President Vladimir Putin, who assumed power 24 years ago with a firm stance against those he labeled as terrorists from the Russian region of Chechnya, which was then embroiled in a violent insurgency.
This security lapse has led to widespread speculation about how gunmen could easily massacre so many people at a public event. A week after the massacre, the focus is on understanding the failure to prevent the concert hall attack and the government’s disorganized response to it.
In recent years, Russia’s vast security apparatus has concentrated on suppressing political opposition, independent media, and civil society groups in the most severe crackdown since the Soviet era. This repression has only intensified following the invasion of Ukraine.
Individual protesters are rapidly suppressed by riot police. After the death of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in prison on February 16, mourners who brought flowers and candles to makeshift memorials were swiftly detained. Surveillance cameras equipped with facial recognition software are widely used.
Many opposition groups have been labeled as “extremists,” a designation that carries lengthy prison sentences for anyone associated with them. Navalny was serving a 19-year sentence on charges of extremism, and his political network is on the register of extremist and terrorist organizations, just like the LGBTQ+ “movement” that was added to the register of Russia’s state watchdog for financial crimes on March 22.
Leonid Volkov, a top associate of Navalny who lives abroad, suggested that the security agencies are too preoccupied with the political crackdown to pay attention to terrorism threats. He stated on his messaging app channel, “They like inventing fictitious terrorists — those who think or love differently — so they don’t have time for real ones.”
After the attack, law enforcement agencies followed a familiar pattern of repression, detaining people over social media posts about the incident that authorities deemed offensive. Andrei Kolesnikov, a senior fellow at Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, argued that security forces focused on Kremlin critics have proven inadequate in addressing real threats to the country.
The U.S. government claimed that it informed Russia in early March about an imminent attack under the “duty to warn” rule, which obliges U.S. intelligence officials to share such information, even with adversaries. However, it was unclear how specific this warning was. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow also issued a public notice on March 7 advising Americans to avoid crowds in the capital over the next 48 hours due to “imminent” plans by extremists to target large gatherings, including concerts.
